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SILENCES AND PECULIARITIES OF THE HAMDAN OPINIONS
PETER E. QUINT*
In this Essay, I would like to focus on what I call the two great
“silences” of the majority opinion in the Hamdan1 case and also touch
upon two peculiarities in the majority opinion and in the concurring
opinion of Justice Kennedy.
I. THE TWO GREAT SILENCES
First, the silences.  These are points in the Court’s argument at
which one might expect to find a sustained discussion of an important
theoretical question, but for one reason or another—perhaps justifia-
ble in at least one of the instances—the Court gives us little or no
explanation, thus leaving aspects of the theoretical structure
unaddressed.
A. Presidential Power in Jackson’s Third Category
The first great silence (touched on also by a number of my col-
leagues in this Workshop2) relates to the separation of powers—or
allocation of authority—between the President and Congress.  Cer-
tainly, with respect to the separation of powers, both the opinion of
Justice Stevens for the majority and the separate opinion of Justice
Kennedy rely to a greater or lesser extent on the concurring opinion
of Justice Jackson in the great Steel Seizure case of 1952.3  Indeed, it has
already been pointed out in comments at this Workshop that Jack-
son’s opinion seems to have achieved the status—in terms of citations
and general approval—of being the “real” opinion of the Court in
that case.
Copyright  2007 by Peter E. Quint.
* Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Maryland School of
Law.  This Essay is a revised version of remarks delivered at a Workshop at the University of
Maryland School of Law on September 21, 2006.  I have attempted to retain the colloquial
tone of the original remarks.  I am grateful to my colleagues in this Workshop, Michael
Greenberger, Jana Singer, and Gordon Young, for valuable comments on earlier drafts of
this Essay.
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. See Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759 (2007);
Gordon G. Young, Youngstown, Hamdan, and “Inherent” Emergency Presidential Policymaking
Powers, 66 MD. L. REV. 787 (2007).
3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Perhaps it could be argued that the Youngstown case, including
Jackson’s opinion, is applicable to domestic affairs only, and not to
the central problems of foreign affairs.  But such an argument seems
clearly incorrect.  Indeed, Youngstown itself involved very significant
foreign affairs aspects, and a slightly revised version of the core of
Jackson’s opinion was applied by the Court in the important “pure”
foreign affairs case of Dames & Moore v. Regan.4
Acknowledging the general framework set down by Jackson in
Youngstown, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan makes clear
that Congress’s statutory choice of policy in §§ 821 and 836 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)5 prevails over a contrary de-
cision of the President.  The Court interprets § 836(b) of the UCMJ to
require general “uniformity” with court martial proceedings, and that
decision prevails over the President’s decision to create military com-
missions that do not possess that uniformity.6  Moreover, § 821 of the
UCMJ (incorporating Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions)
requires a “regularly constituted court,” and that decision prevails
over the President’s decision to create tribunals that, in the Court’s
view, are not “regularly constituted.”7
But why is that the case?  Why should Congress prevail over the
President in this area?  Certainly the President has claimed indepen-
dent constitutional power as Commander in Chief to establish military
commissions.8  Why doesn’t that power prevail over the decision of
Congress?  Aside from a conclusory footnote,9 the Court gives no ex-
plicit answer to this question, and thus we have arrived at the first
great “silence” of the Hamdan case.
4. 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981).
5. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000).
6. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790–93.
7. Id. at 2795–97.
8. Brief for Respondents at 20–23, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). Indeed, the
current Bush Administration has made other broad assertions of unilateral presidential
power in a number of related areas. See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—
Comment: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65,
100–03 (2006).
9. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23.  In this footnote Stevens declares: “Whether or not
the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene mili-
tary commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of
its own war powers, placed on his powers.  See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).  The Government does not argue otherwise.” Id.
The Government may not have asserted the power to disregard congressional limits in
its argument in Hamdan—since it claimed clear statutory authorization for the commis-
sions in any event—but it seems unlikely that the Government has actually conceded this
point either. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 8, at 23 n.4. R
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In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy does note that, under Jack-
son’s analysis, when the President acts in a manner inconsistent with a
statute of Congress, the case falls into Jackson’s famous “third cate-
gory” and therefore the President’s power is “at its lowest ebb.”10  But
Jackson’s evocative metaphor, in itself, does not give us an explana-
tion or answer in Hamdan—because the fact that the President’s
power is “at its lowest ebb” does not necessarily mean that the Presi-
dent will not prevail.
Indeed, Jackson makes this point perfectly clear when he states
that, even under the “severe tests” of the third category, the President
can prevail if his exercise of power lies “within [the President’s] do-
main and beyond control by Congress.”11  Jackson then further em-
phasizes this point by proceeding to an examination of the various
sources of power claimed by the President in Youngstown—including
the “executive power” (Article II, Section One), the Commander-in-
Chief Clause (Article II, Section Two), and the “Take Care” Clause
(Article II, Section Three)—as well as those “nebulous, inherent pow-
ers . . . said to have accrued to the office from the customs and claims
of preceding administrations.”12
Of course, Jackson ultimately found that none of these categories
of presidential power was weighty enough to override a contrary con-
gressional policy under the circumstances of Youngstown.  But that sort
of examination is precisely what is missing in the majority opinion of
Stevens and the concurrence of Justice Kennedy in Hamdan.  As
noted, this is the first great silence of the Hamdan case.
But perhaps it is only a quasi-silence—perhaps a careful examina-
tion of the opinions may reveal an explanation for the Court’s implicit
finding that Congress’s manifested decision in the UCMJ prevails over
the President’s choice under these circumstances.  I have two candi-
dates for such an explanation—one of them quite general and one of
them a little bit more specific.  Both of them require the development
of ideas—or perhaps just hints—from Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion.
First, the general explanation.  In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy suggests that congressional lawmaking is more reliable than
executive action without statute because a statute results from “a delib-
erative and reflective process engaging both of the political branches,”
and statutory standards are “tested over time and insulated from the
10. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (citing Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
11. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 640–55.
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pressures of the moment.”13  These remarks might appropriately be
read together with the comments of Justice Souter in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld,14 the enemy combatant case decided in 2004.  In Hamdi, Souter
emphasized the superiority of legislation—over executive action with-
out statute—in striking a balance between liberty and security:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on
what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty . . . is not
well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government,
whose particular responsibility is to maintain security.  For
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Gov-
ernment asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch
on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the
way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally am-
plify the claim that security legitimately raises.  A reasonable
balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a
different branch . . . .  Hence . . . the need for a clearly ex-
pressed congressional resolution of the competing claims.15
From these theoretical views one might derive the proposition that in
the case of a conflict between legislative and executive choices, a stat-
ute of Congress will almost certainly prevail if the executive action
potentially threatens individual liberties.16  Because individual rights
are potentially threatened in the case of the military commissions, the
legislative choice should prevail.
But this is still pretty general, and perhaps there is a narrower
and more focused explanation.  At the outset of his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy observed that there is “a long tradition of legisla-
tive involvement in matters of military justice,”17 and that this is “a
field with a history of congressional participation and regulation.”18
Perhaps Kennedy is suggesting that in an area in which there has been
a “long tradition” of collaboration between the President and Con-
13. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).  On a related point,
Kennedy also declares that the requirement that war crimes be tried by a “regularly consti-
tuted court,” contained in § 821 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
Geneva Conventions, “relies upon the importance of standards deliberated upon and cho-
sen in advance of crisis.” Id. at 2799–2800.
14. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
15. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
16. For an attempt to elaborate and defend a similar proposition, see Peter E. Quint,
The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law,
1981 DUKE L.J. 1.
17. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
18. Id. at 2800.
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gress, the “living constitution” has been adjusted to incorporate this
form of collaboration as a necessary constitutional precondition for
action.19  If a case in this area falls within Jackson’s third category, the
required collaboration is absent by definition—because the President
is acting in a manner that is contrary to the legislative choice—and
thus the President’s action cannot prevail.
If the argument from tradition and custom controls here, it
would be an interesting moment in the history of adjudication on the
separation of powers.  Ordinarily it is the President who seeks to ex-
tend executive authority by asserting claims of custom.  The case of
presidential war powers assertions in the post-World War II period is
an eminent example: if the President has sent troops into actual or
potential hostilities fifty times in the past, then that custom or tradi-
tion—under such an argument—aids in establishing actual constitu-
tional authority for the President to do something along the same
lines again.20  In Hamdan, however, custom and tradition are arguably
being employed by the Justices—very interestingly—to support con-
gressional rather than presidential power.
B. The Status of the Geneva Conventions
The second great silence of the Hamdan opinion concerns
whether the Geneva Conventions are applicable in this case. Hamdan
argued that the military commissions established by President Bush’s
executive order violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions in a number of ways—particularly because Hamdan’s military
commission was not a “regularly constituted court” as required by
Common Article 3.21  Although the Government denied that the mili-
19. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (“The Constitution is a framework for government.  Therefore the
way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated accord-
ing to its true nature. . . .  It is [inadmissibly narrow to be confined] to the words of the
Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”).
20. See, e.g., Memorandum from Leonard C. Meeker, State Dep’t Legal Adviser, to the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-Nam (Mar. 4, 1966), in 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474, 484 (1966) (noting “at least 125 in-
stances” of presidential troop deployment without prior congressional authorization);
Memorandum from the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Authority of the
President to Repel the Attack in Korea (July 3, 1950), in 23 DEP’T ST. BULL. 173, 177–78 (1950)
(listing 85 such instances).  For a similar argument in a different context, see United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding presidential withdrawal of oil lands
from government sale, in a manner apparently contrary to statute, because of the “long
continued practice” of similar presidential orders).
21. Brief for Petitioner at 48–50, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184).  For historical
background and analysis of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provide humani-
tarian rules for the treatment of wounded and sick combatants, prisoners of war, and civil-
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tary commissions violated the Geneva Conventions, its main response
was that those conventions were in any event not enforceable in the
American courts.  Indeed, such a position had been endorsed by the
court below in the Hamdan case—a panel of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, which included John Roberts, future Chief
Justice of the United States.22
What exactly is the difference between a judicially enforceable
treaty and one that is not judicially enforceable, and how did such a
distinction arise?  If you examine the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution, you immediately see that “Treaties made . . . under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”23  The
Constitution and the laws of the United States are also “the supreme
law of the land” and, as such, they are generally enforceable in the
American courts in a proper case or controversy.  The Geneva Con-
ventions, signed by the President and approved by two-thirds of the
Senate, are “treaties made under the authority of the United States,”
and therefore it would seem to follow that, as the “supreme law of the
land,” they are also enforceable in the American courts.
So it would seem at least.  But as far back as 1829, Chief Justice
Marshall said, “Wait a minute.  Not so fast.”  According to Marshall,
there are two kinds of treaties of the United States.  Some treaties are
“self-executing” treaties and are therefore immediately enforceable in
American courts without the requirement of any further legislative ac-
tion.  But, in contrast, some treaties are “non-self-executing” and
therefore not enforceable in the American courts until they have been
brought into United States law—or “executed”—by a statute of
Congress.24
ians in wartime, see Anton Schlo¨gel, Geneva Red Cross Conventions and Protocols, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
22. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38–40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51 (1833).  Chief Justice Marshall does not actually use the terms “self-executing”
and “non-self-executing” in making this distinction—although he does state that, in the
second class of cases, “the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule
for the Court.” Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).  But numerous modern cases, as
well as the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, do employ this vocabulary. See, e.g., Lidas,
Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3)–(4), cmt. h (1987).
In some instances there may be a separate question of whether or not a “self-execut-
ing” treaty also gives rise to an individual cause of action—for example, an action for dam-
ages.  But since there is no such damage action in Hamdan, and the claimed treaty rights
are essentially being asserted as a defense to prosecution, this separate question does not
arise. See Carlos Manuel Va´zquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM.
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As far as anything in the text of the Constitution is concerned,
this distinction seems to have been made up by Marshall out of whole
cloth—because, of course, the Constitution speaks only of “treaties
made under the authority of the United States” and does not distin-
guish between them according to their “self-executing” or “non-self-
executing” quality.  But perhaps Marshall’s position becomes more
comprehensible if we accept the view that, in the case of a non-self-
executing treaty, the treaty itself has delegated to Congress the task of
transforming the treaty’s obligations into judicially enforceable law.25
Thus, even a non-self-executing treaty is the “law of the land,” but the
“law” itself says, “Wait for Congress.”
Although Marshall’s language in Foster v. Neilson26 may perhaps
suggest that this distinction is ordinarily quite easy to draw, in point of
fact the question of whether a treaty is self-executing often poses very
difficult issues of interpretation—resting apparently on the (perhaps
imputed) intention of the American makers of the treaty.27  To take
polar opposite cases, a bilateral treaty of great specificity, which grants
clearly defined rights to citizens of the treaty partner, may well be
found judicially enforceable without further legislation;28 in contrast,
a multilateral treaty that sets forth its goals in very general aspirational
language is likely to be considered non-self-executing.29  Moreover, it
seems clear that if the Senate, in its resolution of approval, expressly
states that the treaty is to be considered non-self-executing, the Sen-
ate’s resolution will probably be observed.30  But the great range of
intermediate cases may raise very difficult issues.
L. REV. 1082, 1085 (1992). In any event, Hamdan’s cause of action was authorized by the
habeas corpus statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
25. Va´zquez, supra note 24, at 1125–28. R
26. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(4)(a); id. § 111 cmt. h and reporters’ note 5.
28. Thus, in Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), the Supreme Court invoked a
bilateral treaty with Japan to invalidate a Seattle city ordinance requiring pawnbrokers to
be citizens of the United States.  The treaty gave Japanese citizens residing in the United
States the same rights to carry on occupations as possessed by American citizens.  There
was no statute of Congress “executing” the treaty provision, but the Court assumed that the
treaty was self-executing.
29. In Sei Fujii v. State, for example, the Supreme Court of California found that gen-
eral human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter—a treaty of the United
States—“lack[ed] the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent
to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification.  Instead, they
are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations.”  242 P.2d 617, 621–22
(Cal. 1952).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(4)(b).  For an important example of such action by the Senate, see United States
Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on
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This, then, is the second great silence of the Hamdan case, be-
cause we have no real discussion in Stevens’s opinion for the Court or
in Kennedy’s concurrence, on the question of whether the Geneva
Conventions, or relevant parts of them, are self-executing or create
judicially enforceable rights—even though a decision on this question
formed a significant part of the holding of the court below.31  The
reason that we do not have any discussion of this question, is that the
Court employs very general language in § 821 of the UCMJ to find
that Congress has actually incorporated the Geneva Conventions into
domestic law—“executed” the treaty, in Marshall’s language—at least
with respect to the limitations on military commissions in § 821.
The Court’s reasoning on this point runs as follows:
(1) Section 821 in effect grants military commissions “jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried by military commissions”;32
(2) Therefore “compliance with the law of war is the condition
upon which the authority set forth in [§ 821] is granted”;33
(3) The provisions of the Geneva Conventions are “part of the
law of war”;34
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781, § III (1992) (stating that the substantive
provisions of the Covenant are “not self-executing”).  Furthermore, the Constitution may
require that certain types of provisions—for example, the definition of federal criminal
offenses—must be set forth in statute; and therefore the adoption of such provisions by
treaty might not be constitutionally sufficient to create an enforceable criminal offense.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(4)(c); id.
§ 111 cmt. i.
31. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38–40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  The Supreme Court’s
only explicit reference in Hamdan to the status of the Geneva Conventions as self-executing
or not is couched in hypothetical form:
We may assume that “the obvious scheme” of the 1949 Conventions is identical in
all relevant respects to that of the 1929 Convention, and even that that scheme
would, absent some other provision of law, preclude Hamdan’s invocation of the
Convention’s provisions as an independent source of law binding the Govern-
ment’s actions and furnishing petitioner with any enforceable right.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794 (2006) (footnote omitted).  Although this lan-
guage might possibly be interpreted as tending in the direction of the “non-self-executing”
nature of the Conventions, the Court then immediately cites, with apparent approval, an
amicus brief and other materials that take the opposite position. Id. at 2794 n.58 (citing
Brief of Louis Henkin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (No. 05-184)).  The result is, I believe, that the Court leaves us with nothing signifi-
cant one way or the other on this point.
32. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
33. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794.
34. Id.
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(4) Therefore, § 821 constitutes a statutory prohibition of any as-
pect of trial by military commission that is inconsistent with the Ge-
neva Conventions.35
For at least two separate reasons, this statutory interpretation of
§ 821 seems debatable; in any case, even if it is ultimately justified, it
certainly involves something of an interpretative stretch.  First, by its
terms, § 821 imposes the limitations of “the law of war” only on the
“offenders or offenses” that may be tried by military commissions; its
language imposes no explicit limitations on the procedure to be em-
ployed by those commissions or the circumstances under which the
commissions may be established.36
Second, the laconic term “law of war” may or may not have been
intended by Congress to incorporate non-self-executing treaties into
domestic law; perhaps it was only a reference to the existing domestic
American law of war, including self-executing treaties and those non-
self-executing treaties that may have been incorporated into domestic
law in a more explicit manner.37  In any case, if the Geneva Conven-
tions turned out to be “non-self-executing,” perhaps a more explicit
statement of “execution” would be required under the implications of
existing doctrine.38  Certainly the asserted incorporation of the Ge-
neva Conventions into domestic law in § 821 is by no means as explicit
as the provision in the War Crimes Act of 1996,39 which provided fed-
eral criminal penalties for persons who violate Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions—specifically referring to that article by
name.
But the War Crimes Act may also have given the Court an inter-
pretive tool that could have been employed to good advantage to
achieve the Court’s result.  One might well argue that a procedure
that has been made a criminal offense by federal statute—that is, a
35. As noted below, the Court went on to find that the military commissions, as estab-
lished by the President, were indeed inconsistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions because they were not “regularly constituted courts,” as required by that Arti-
cle. Id. at 2796–97.  Moreover, a four-Justice plurality found that Common Article 3 was
also violated because the commissions’ procedures—allowing introduction of evidence
that was not disclosed to the defendant—failed to afford “all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,” as required by Common Article 3.
Id. at 2797–98 (plurality opinion).
36. See id. at 2845–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. Cf. id. at 2845 (Section 821 “does not purport to render judicially enforceable as-
pects of the law of war that are not so enforceable of their own accord”).
38. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 8, at 36 (“[A] statutory reference to the ‘law R
of war,’ without more, . . . cannot render judicially enforceable a treaty that does not by its
terms create judicially enforceable rights.”).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2000).
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violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—certainly
cannot be a legitimate component of the structure of a military com-
mission of the United States.  Furthermore, as the War Crimes Act
expressly makes the interpretation of Common Article 3 justiciable for
the purposes of assessing criminal liability, it should follow that Con-
gress also intended that the courts may apply Common Article 3 in
order to prevent a procedure that could give rise to criminal liability
under the War Crimes Act from becoming part of the judicial struc-
ture of the United States in the military commissions.  An argument of
this sort might have led to the Court’s result on this question in a less
circuitous and perhaps more persuasive manner.40
II. TWO PECULIARITIES
A. Doubts on Statutory Authorization
I would now like to turn briefly to two oddities or peculiarities
that appear to be tucked away in the corners of the opinions of Jus-
tices Stevens and Kennedy.  The first relates to the question of
whether the Court conceived that the then-existing statutory regime
would have authorized the military commission established to try
Hamdan, even if the precise problems identified by the Court were
cured.  This examination might incidentally throw some light on the
Court’s attitude in approaching this case.
This issue arises in the following manner: the majority opinion of
Justice Stevens, as well as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, focused on
specific ways in which the military commissions established by presi-
dential executive order are inconsistent with statutory requirements of
the UCMJ.  Thus, according to the Court, the military commissions
were illegal because they did not satisfy the principle of “uniformity”
with court martial proceedings contained in § 836(b) of the UCMJ,41
and because they did not conform to certain requirements of the “law
40. In any event, the Congress that enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), appears to have foreseen this possible
approach.  In statutory language enacted after Hamdan was decided, Congress appeared to
nullify the force of this and related arguments by narrowing criminal liability for violation
of Common Article 3 to “grave breaches” of that Article—e.g., torture, murder, hostage
taking, and other violent acts.  § 6(b), 120 Stat. at 2633–34.  Accordingly, the imposition of
punishment by a tribunal whose structure or establishment violated Common Article 3
would no longer be a criminal offense under the War Crimes Act.  More broadly, § 5 of the
MCA purports to prohibit the application of the Geneva Conventions “as a source of rights
in any court of the United States” in habeas corpus and similar actions.  § 5, 120 Stat. at
2631.  The interpretation and force of these provisions of the MCA are likely to become
the subject of future litigation.
41. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790–93.
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of war” set forth in § 821 (incorporating Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions42).  Moreover, a plurality of four Justices also
found that the UCMJ was violated because conspiracy to commit war
crimes—the charge filed against Hamdan—is not a violation of the
“law of war.”43  The plurality also found that withholding certain evi-
dence from the defendant, as permitted by the commission’s proce-
dures, violated “judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples,” another requirement of Common
Article 3.44
An initial reading of the opinion might suggest, therefore, that
the Justices would find that the military commissions were authorized
by statute if these important procedural flaws were cured.
A more careful reading of the opinions, however, indicates at
least some uncertainty on this subject.  A first note of doubt is raised
in Stevens’s opinion for the Court, when he indicates that the military
commissions were “not contemplated by Article I, § 8 and Article III,
§ 1 of the Constitution”45 and, as a result, “that authority, if it exists,
can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and
Congress in time of war.”46
We receive a second hint of uncertainty when Justice Stevens
characterizes as “controversial” the holding of the Quirin47 case that
Article of War 15 (the fore-runner of § 821 of the UCMJ) provided
congressional authorization for military commissions.48  The Court
then proceeded to reject the government’s argument that two recent
enactments—the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF)49 and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)50—pro-
vided a more solid statutory foundation for the military commis-
sions.51  In sum, therefore, the commissions have no more authority
42. Id. at 2794–97.
43. Id. at 2777–85 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 2797–98; see also supra note 35. R
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
48. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.  At this point, moreover, Stevens cites an amicus brief
that presented the argument that the reference to “military commissions” in Article 15 did
not in fact provide congressional authorization for the commissions, but rather was in-
tended only to preserve the commissions’ previously-existing and considerably narrower
jurisdiction. Id. (citing Brief of Legal Scholars and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 12–15, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184)).
49. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp.
III 2003)).
50. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1).
51. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774–75.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR306.txt unknown Seq: 12  4-MAY-07 13:49
2007] SILENCES AND PECULIARITIES OF THE HAMDAN OPINIONS 783
than they had at the time when the Court issued its “controversial”
finding of authorization in Quirin.  That the Court retains some skep-
ticism, at least, about that holding is clearly signaled in the Court’s
final words on this question.  Stevens concludes: “Together, the
UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowledge a general Presi-
dential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances
where justified under the ‘Constitution and laws,’ including the law of
war.”52  The telling phrase “at most” makes clear that the Court is not
even conceding presidential authority under the then-existing statu-
tory regime, even if the procedural flaws found by the Court were
cured.
It seems to me that the effect of this seemingly trivial phrase “at
most”—together with the other signs of uncertainty noted above—is
to revive the doubts about general congressional authorization that
were raised, but rejected, at the time of the Quirin case.  One may
speculate that it is in such small and subtle ways that the majority’s
accumulated mistrust of the present government finds a form of ex-
pression—in a reluctance to concede anything at all to the President
that is not absolutely necessary.  Presumably, it was doubts of this kind
that also impelled Congress to attempt to put these military commis-
sions on a stronger legislative footing in the recently adopted Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).53  With the question of statutory au-
thority now apparently cleared away, of course, the underlying consti-
tutional issues relating to the military commissions may now have to
be confronted by the courts.
B. The Status of International Law
Finally, the most intriguing of the peculiarities in Hamdan is
found in the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy.  In Hamdan, the
Court found against the Bush Administration on a very important is-
sue, and—as is sometimes the case in such circumstances—Justices
may have felt impelled to explain that the decision was not quite so
damaging to the government as it might appear.  Thus, in a short con-
currence, Justice Breyer emphasized that the decision was based on
the inconsistency of the presidential order with existing statutes, and
of course the President may go to Congress and ask that those statutes
be amended.54
52. Id. at 2775 (emphasis added).
53. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“The President is authorized to
establish military commissions under this chapter . . . .”).
54. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Breyer states: “Congress
has denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions of the
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Justice Kennedy also says something along these lines, but the way
in which he phrases what seems essentially to be the same point may
open up some intriguing and unexplored possibilities.  Read carefully
what Justice Kennedy says: “[Our discussion] returns us to the point of
beginning—that domestic statutes control this case.  If Congress, after
due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the controlling
statutes, in conformance with the Constitution and other laws, it has the
power and prerogative to do so.”55
Please read this language over again and then try to answer the
following question: What can it mean?  What possibly can Kennedy
mean by the phrase “in conformance with the Constitution and other
laws”—and, more specifically, by the phrase “in conformance with
other laws?”  What “other laws” could Kennedy possibly have in mind?
In order to approach this question, let us return to traditional
doctrine and ask ourselves the following question: What binds Con-
gress?  In the traditional view, of course, the Constitution of the
United States binds Congress, at least since Marbury v. Madison.56  But
what are these “other laws” that, Kennedy suggests, also bind Con-
gress?  Certainly Congress is not bound by its own previous statutes—
that is clear enough.  Moreover, Congress is certainly not bound by
any common law doctrines—except to the extent they have been rec-
ognized by the courts as also being constitutional principles.  Yet Ken-
nedy seems to be saying that Congress has the “power and
prerogative” to “change the controlling statutes” only if it acts “in con-
formance with the Constitution and other laws.”  Indeed, the only
“other laws” that seem to be left are the doctrines of international
law—either treaty law or the general principles of international law,
or both.
Unless the insertion of this phrase resulted from some sort of slip
of the pen and is therefore just a mistake, it would seem that Kennedy
is asserting the possibility, at least, that Congress is bound by some sort
of international law in the enactment of its statutes.  If one casts one’s
eye across the constitutions of the world, one will see that this is cer-
tainly not an unprecedented position: to take one example, the Basic
Law (Constitution) for the Federal Republic of Germany declares that
kind at issue here.  Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary.” Id.  Justice Breyer of course takes no position on the
question of whether that authorization, in the form granted by Congress, would be
constitutional.
55. Id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added).
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the general principles of international law are indeed superior to
statutes.57
Yet, such a position has never been adopted—or, as far as I know,
even suggested—by the Supreme Court or any of its Justices.58  In the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (Article VI, cl. 2), statutes precede
treaties as “the supreme law of the land,” and, in any case, it has long
been prevailing doctrine that statutes and treaties are of equal dignity
and, therefore, the later in time controls—as is the case between two
statutes.  Accordingly, a later statute can nullify the internal effect of
an earlier treaty (although such an action may cause the United States
to be in violation of international law, as far as the outside world is
concerned).59
Of course, the general principles of international law are not
even mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, even though according to
cases like The Paquete Habana,60 those principles are nonetheless part
of the domestic law of the United States.61  But, under these circum-
stances, it might seem extremely difficult to assert that this form of
international law could override or control a statute of Congress, and
the prevailing view has always held to the contrary.62
In this light, the apparently offhand suggestion of Justice Ken-
nedy seems to be intriguing—indeed, in a quiet way, revolutionary—
because he seems to be suggesting that some form of “other” law, pre-
sumably international law, could limit Congress’s power and preroga-
tive “to change the controlling statutes.”
I would like to note one additional point on the question of the
number of Justices concurring in this remark of Justice Kennedy.  Ac-
cording to the Court’s rubric, Kennedy’s opinion is joined “as to Parts
57. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 25 (F.R.G.).
58. Several eminent scholars, however, have advocated such a position. See, e.g., Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 872–78 (1987).
59. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115(1)(b) (1987).
60. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
61. Id. at 700.
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115(1)(a) (“An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law” or treaty,
if Congress’s purpose to do so is clear); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946)
(affirming that courts will respect the international laws of war “so far as they do not con-
flict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution”).  On the other hand, it is also
accepted that domestic statutes should be interpreted in a manner consistent with interna-
tional law, if such an interpretation is possible.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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I and II” by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.63  Thus Kennedy is
speaking for four Justices (including himself) in the main body of his
concurring opinion.  Yet the remark just quoted on the subject of the
“other laws” is located in a brief prefatory introduction and is itself not
part of either Part I or Part II—and therefore, it seems to be the case
that Kennedy is speaking here only for himself.
Yet in the last paragraph of Part II, Kennedy returns to something
like this point and offers a similar observation—in language, however,
that is subtly different.  In this last paragraph, Kennedy observes: “In
sum, as presently structured, Hamdan’s military commission exceeds
the bounds Congress has placed on the President’s authority in §§ 836
and 821 of the UCMJ.  Because Congress has prescribed these limits,
Congress can change them, requiring a new analysis consistent with the
Constitution and other governing laws.”64
I find this passage completely ambiguous.  It could mean some-
thing banal: after Congress changes the statutes, the general legal situ-
ation must be reassessed in light of the Constitution, those new
statutes of Congress, and other “governing laws.”  But it could also be
intended as a reprise of the apparently more revolutionary language
set forth in Kennedy’s introductory section: after Congress enacts new
statutes, we must analyze the validity of those statutes not only under
the Constitution, but also under “other governing laws”—that is, pre-
sumably, under certain principles of international law.  Perhaps Ken-
nedy is so alone—in the possible view imputed to him above—that
one or more of the other three Justices insisted on this ambiguity in
the part of the opinion that represented the views of four Justices.
It is not very easy at this point to know whether there is really
anything in this peculiarity of Kennedy’s opinion in Hamdan.  Only
time, and additional adjudication in this area, may clarify Justice Ken-
nedy’s position.  Yet, as the intellectual voyages of numerous judges in
American history attest, the process of experience can be a powerful
educational force on the minds of individuals who—through appoint-
ment to the federal judiciary—are freed from many of the pressures
of politics and of the workaday world.  And it may therefore be the
case that the international education of Justice Kennedy—referred to
by my colleague Michael Greenberger65—is an ongoing process that
may yet contain some surprises.
63. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part).
64. Id. at 2808 (emphasis added).
65. See Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post-Hamdan Con-
flict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805, 823–28 (2007).
